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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANA D. EDWARDS (ROSS), 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BRUCE C. EDWARDS 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e) and/or (h) (Supp. 1995), 
which provides that the court has appellate jurisdiction over 
appeals from the district court involving criminal and domestic 
relations cases. 
This appeal is proper pursuant to U.C.A. §77-18a-l(a), as it 
follows an order finding contempt pursuant to U.C.A. §78-32-1(5). 
This order followed an evidentiary hearing before the Honorable 
Rodney S. Page, Judge of the Second Judicial District Court of 
Davis County, on the 23rd day of July, 1996. 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court was correct in failing to 
disqualify itself for bias and prejudice. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's determinations of law 
will be reviewed for "correctness." This matter approximates a 
"de novo" review as the appellate courts closely and regularly 
determine the legal effect of specific facts. State v. Pena, 869 
1 
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P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in summarily 
finding contempt of court where the prospective contemptuous 
behavior, indirect in nature, had not occurred. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's determinations of law 
will be reviewed for "correctness" i.e., the appellate court owes 
no deference to the lower court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendment XIV 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION Article I, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law. 
UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 63(b) 
Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, 
civil or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an 
affidavit that the judge before whom such action or proceeding is 
to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such 
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the 
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call 
in another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
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Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for 
the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed 
as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or such 
bias or prejudice is known. If the judge against whom the 
affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, 
he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be 
forthwith certified to another judge (naming him) of the same 
court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then 
pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. If the judge 
against whom the affidavit is directed does not question the 
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the 
affidavit is certified finds that it is legally sufficient, 
another judge must be called in to try the case or determine the 
matter in question. No party shall be entitled in any case to 
file more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be 
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record 
that such affidavit and application are made in good faith. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED Section §78-2a-3(2)(e)(i) 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: (e) interlocutory 
appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; (i) 
appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property 
division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED Section §78-32-1(5) 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or 
proceeding therein are contempts of the authority of the court: 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the 
court. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED Section §78-32-3 
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence 
of the court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, 
for which an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring 
in such immediate view and presence, adjudging that the person 
proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt, and that he be 
punished as prescribed in Section 78-32-10 thereof. When the 
contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of 
the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented 
to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or 
a statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other 
judicial officers. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the order, rendered by the Honorable 
Rodney S. Page on the 23rd day of July, 1996, finding Mr. Bruce 
Edwards, appellant, in contempt pursuant to §78-32-1(5) 
U.C.A.(1953) for a prospective failure to comply with a court 
decree. The appellant also appeals the court's previous ruling 
concerning the legal insufficiency of the appellant's affidavit 
for disqualification filed prior to the above referenced hearing. 
The parties herein, having one child, were divorced in November 
of 1985, and since that time have had numerous court hearings. 
Pursuant to the most recent Order to Show Cause brought by the 
custodial parent Jana Edwards (Ross) the court ordered that Mr. 
Edwards pay child support on or before the 10th of each month. 
The court further ordered that for any and all months the 
payments were not timely, the defendant would be in contempt, 
sentenced to 30 days jail and a bench warrant issued for his 
arrest. The court also granted judgment for attorney fees in the 
sum of $250.00 for plaintiff's counsel and ordered that the fees 
be paid at the rate of $50.00 per month with similar contempt 
provisions. The appellant now appeals this order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties, previously husband and wife, were divorced in 
November of 1985, in the District Court of Davis County, State of 
Utah. Plaintiff was granted the custody of the parties minor 
child, namely: Wesley Kenneth Edwards, presently 14 years of age. 
Defendant, Bruce C. Edwards, was granted visitation with the 
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child and was ordered to pay child support in an amount set by 
the court. The amount of the child support was later raised to 
the sum of $175.00 per month. On November 6, 1995, at the 
request of plaintiff, Jana D. Edwards (Ross), a hearing was held 
wherein Ms. Edwards sought contempt sanctions against Mr. Edwards 
for failure to pay five months of child support and certain 
marital debts as set forth in the parties' divorce decree. The 
amount of the marital debt to be paid by Mr. Edwards was 
undefined at the time of the divorce. In December of 1995, the 
marital debt was fixed and the defendant stipulated that he would 
pay the recently determined amount. The court ruled that Mr. 
Edwards was in contempt of court for his failure to pay this 
marital debt and sentenced him to 3 days in jail. 
In May of 1996, plaintiff brought another Order to Show 
Cause In re Contempt, along with her petition for modification of 
the decree of divorce, claiming, among other things, that the 
defendant had failed to pay child support for two months. 
Plaintiff requested an adjudication of contempt, judgment for the 
past due support, attorney fees and related relief. In the 
modification petition, plaintiff sought to increase the support 
and to terminate the child visitation. 
Just prior to her above referenced filing, plaintiff denied 
defendant's summer visitation with his son. (Tr. 20) As a result 
defendant sought a restraining order to allow visitation. The 
proposed order was presented to Judge W. Brent West, in Weber 
County. Judge West signed the order, but then rescinded after 
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conferring by telephone with Judge Page (addendum IV). During 
the telephone conference Judge Page on his own motion suspended 
Mr. Edwards' visitation until further court hearing. (Tr. 21) 
In June of 1996, prior to the hearing on plaintiff's Order 
to Show Cause, defendant filed with the court his affidavit 
seeking the disqualification of District Judge Page (addendum 
II), pursuant to Rule 63, Utah R. Civ. P. Plaintiff, appellee 
herein, filed an affidavit in opposition. Both affidavits were 
reviewed by District Judge Jon Memmott, who subsequently denied 
the disqualification in his written ruling of June 18, 1996 
(addendum III). 
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause and Petition for 
Modification came on for hearing before Judge Page on the 3rd of 
July, 1996. The defendant was again found to be in contempt for 
his failure to keep his child support current. Specifically, the 
court found that Mr. Edwards had missed two consecutive months of 
child support payments; (Tr. 63) notwithstanding the fact that no 
evidence of such was presented at the hearing. (Tr. 33) However, 
it was determined that Mr. Edwards was current at the time of the 
hearing. (Tr. 4) Based on the contempt finding, the court 
entered a jail sentence of 30 days and stayed the sentence on the 
condition of future performance.(Tr. 65) Further, the court 
ordered that the defendant pay his child support on the 5th of 
each month through the clerk of the court and in the event the 
payment is not made by the 10th of the month, then the defendant 
would be adjudged in contempt, sentenced to 30 days jail and a 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The appellant's right to fair trial under the sixth 
amendment of the United States Constitution was violated when the 
trial court displayed actual bias and prejudice toward the 
defendant, but refused to disqualify himself. The appellant's 
constitutional right to due process under the fourteenth 
amendment of the United States Constitution was violated when the 
trial court ordered that he be held in contempt in the event his 
future child support obligations were not timely met. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS INCORRECT WHEN IT FAILED 
TO DISQUALIFY ITSELF FOR BIAS AND PREJUDICE. 
In Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520 (Utah 1948), the court 
held that actual bias and prejudice on the part of a judge 
disqualifies him. The court went on to define the key terms, 
bias and prejudice "mean a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will 
toward one of the litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism 
towards one." Id. at 520. In the case at hand the defendant 
timely filed an affidavit with the trial court pursuant to Rule 
63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (addendum 2) 
The court of appeals found in Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 
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judgment rather than a citation of contempt. However, prior to 
advancing this argument the court took the unusual step of 
ordering counsel not to make such an argument. The court then 
ruled that defendant was in contempt; notwithstanding the fact 
that defendant was not allowed an opportunity to explain why the 
debts remained unpaid. Defendant was sentenced to 3 days in the 
Davis County Jail. 
As a general proposition, a judge should recuse himself when 
his "impartiality" might reasonably be questioned. Utah Code of 
Judicial Conduct 3(c)(1)(b) (1981). This standard set forth by 
the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct should be given careful 
consideration by the trial judge as it may require recusal in 
instances where no actual bias is shown. State v. Neeley, 748 
P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988). The court's various statements made 
during the July hearing coupled with the prior ruling of contempt 
allow for Judge Page's impartiality to be questioned. 
In Lilieberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 108 S. 
Ct. 2194 (1988), the United States Supreme Court concluded that 
disqualifying facts which a federal district judge should have 
known but which he had forgotten were sufficient to disqualify 
the judge under the federal statute. While the federal statute 
in question in that case, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982), requires 
disqualification for an appearance of bias, the court's 
preference is clear. In the interests of promoting confidence in 
the judiciary a judge should recuse himself when faced with 
legitimate, substantive reasons. 
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questioned the defendant's integrity when it found that the 
defendant had not filed recent income tax returns. 
In Boyinaton, 200 P.2d 723 (Utah 1948), the court found that 
with "the haste, the procedural irregularities, and the lack of 
consideration shown the defendant . . . , it is apparent that the 
judge became hostile to the defendant and biased and prejudiced 
to the extent" Id. at 727-728 that disqualification would have 
been necessary. The court found that the trial court's "actions 
and words adequately displayed bias and prejudice, and as a 
result, a person in defendant's predicament could never be 
convinced that he was fairly tried, convicted and sentenced." Id. 
b. The judge who reviewed defendant's 
affidavit for legal sufficiency did so 
improperly. 
The court in Young v. Patterson, 922 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1996), 
opined concerning Rule 63(b) of the Utah R. Civ. Pro., that "the 
rule's operation will render a trial judge unable to defend 
[himself] against false or inaccurate allegations." Id. at 1281 
The court made this observation in acknowledging that the 
affidavit for disqualification was to be presented to the 
reviewing judge without opposition. The judge who reviews the 
affidavit does so for "legal sufficiency" only. He does not 
weigh evidence. The court further stated the an "affidavit may 
be false but not so demonstrably so and therefore legally 
'sufficient' for purposes of rule." Id. at 1280. In the case at 
hand Judge Jon M. Memmot goes beyond a review of "legal 
sufficiency" and determines that Mr. Edwards' affidavit is not 
12 
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added, " [e]very month you fail to make the payment on time will 
be a seperate contempt." (Tr. 65 emphasis added) Further, the 
court added that " . . . you have one 30 day commitment right now. 
If there are any future, any of those contempts will be added 
onto that 30 day period." (Tr. 65) The court's position is 
clear. Ms. Edwards by merely notifying the court ex-parte of an 
untimely payment will trigger a 30 day jail sentence. The 
imposition of the sentence will not follow an inquiry into the 
circumstance of Mr. Edwards' noncompliance with the order. 
A finding of out of court contempt requires specific 
procedural protections, namely a hearing. Under section 78-32-3, 
an affidavit must be presented to the court reciting the facts 
constituting the alleged contemptuous conduct. Case law 
recognizes that, as a function of due process, one charged with 
indirect contempt must "be advised of the nature of the action 
against him, have assistance of counsel, if requested, have the 
right to confront witnesses, and have the right to offer 
testimony on his behalf." Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, at 
1322 (Utah 1982). 
The necessity of an affidavit ensures "that the court and 
the person charged are informed of the conduct alleged to be 
contemptuous." Von Hake, 759 P.2d 1162, at 1170. "An affidavit 
satisfies section 78-32-3 and due process if it sets forth the 
acts done or omitted that form the factual basis for the contempt 
charge." State v. Long, 844 P.2d 381, at 384 (Utah App. 1992). 
This Court has ruled that where no such affidavit is presented to 
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I hereby certify that two true and
 accurate copies of tl le 
foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed first-class, postage 
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Brian R. Florence 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
818 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah R-:m 
Paul* H. Olds 
ADDEftDU 
on this 
of this 
months < 
occasion. Shortly aitci he 
petition, he brought one of 
current 
delivered June 
that to 
current 
it's th< 
received 
those de'. 
, and then yesterday afternoon 
support to my office 
my client this afternoon. 
So at least as of right now, 
in his 
notice 
Linquent 
he 
and I have given 
Mr. Edwards is 
support through the month of June, but 
a same old story. We're out of court two 
months and he starts to become more tardy and fall 
behind and he just doesn't get it, or if he does get 
it, he manipulates it. 
This Court has previously entered a judgment 
for attorney fees. It is our view that Mr. Edwards, 
being in the business that he is, is basically 
judgment proof. He knows how to work the system, 
he's involved with judgments and collection of 
judgments and has previously boasted to my client 
that she wouldn't ever be able to collect a simple, 
ordinary judgment. 
In point of fact, every time she has to hire 
me to take some action, she agrees to pay me a 
reasonable attorney fee, and in a sense then it comes 
out of the support she is otherwise receiving and, 
thereby, Mr. Edwards, in effect, is escaping an 
obligation of child support. 
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1 A. She did call me once. 
2 Q. Okay. You sought, in fact, to obtain an ex parte 
3 order from the Court to give you the child for your 
4 summer visitation? 
5 A . I did. 
6 Q. And that was a pro se order that you had prepared 
7 and affidavit. 
8 A. That's correct. 
9 Q. Apparently, you met with Judge West, if I recall, 
10 personally? 
11 A. That's correct. 
12 Q. And then he contacted this Court? 
13 A. That's correct. 
14 Q. And then — in fact, he'd signed it and then 
15 whited it out after talking with this Court. This 
16 Court apparently indicated -- as you understand -- to 
17 Judge West that visitation would be put on hold until 
18 today. 
19 A. That's correct 
20 Q. There would be no visitation. 
21 A. That's correct. 
22 Q. Okay. Notwithstanding that, apparently you have 
23 seen your son once or twice since that date? 
24 A . I have. Twice. 
25 Q. And what were the circumstances of you seeing 
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1 Wesley on those occasions, Bruce? Did you go to the 
2 house and get him? 
3 A . I did not. 
4 Q. Why not? 
5 A. Because you suggested that I do not do so. 
6 Q. Well, I told you what Judge West told me 
7 telephonically. 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. All right. So to avoid being in contempt of any 
10 court, you declined to seek the custody -- or the 
11 visitation with the child? 
12 A . I did. 
13 Q. All right. How did you -- how did it come to you 
14 then that you had these visits? 
15 A. My ex-wife delivered my son to my parent's house 
16 the day before Father's Day and then one other time. 
17 Q. So you've seen him those two times? 
18 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. Okay. Mr. Edwards, let me move quickly through 
20 this. You have some feelings towards your son, do 
21 you not? 
22 A . I do. 
23 Q. Do you have a desire to have visitation with 
24 Wesley? 
25 A . I do. 
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1 Q. And then the support for April and May was 
2 delivered at one time by Wesley, those two payments 
3 being made on June 16th. Do you dispute that? 
4 A . I don't recall the dates that Wesley delivered 
5 any of those checks. 
6 Q. Do you dispute that you gave him the support on 
7 the dates that I have just mentioned? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Mr. Knowlton has just handed me checks — copies 
10 of checks purportedly being your child support 
11 checks, and there are two that are dated June 6th and 
12 June 10th for $175 each. Do you deny that those 
13 would be checks payable for your support for April 
14 and May? 
15 A. (No response.) 
16 Q. You delivered June support yesterday to me, 
17 correct, Mr. Edwards? 
18 A. That's correct. 
19 Q. And so the two checks dated June 10th and June 
20 6th — 
21 A. The check dated June 10th was the one I delivered 
22 to you yesterday. 
23 (Off-the-record discussion between Mr. 
24 Florence and Ms. Ross.) 
25 Q. (By Mr. Florence) Well, while she's looking for 
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1 MR. EDWARDS: I'd have to go through 
2 my budget and see exactly what my cash flow is. 
3 MR. KNOWLTON: That's all, Judge. 
4 THE COURT: You may step — well, I 
5 have a couple of questions myself. 
6 Mr. Edwards, what did your income tax return 
7 show for the year 1995 as to gross receipts from your 
8 business? 
9 MR. EDWARDS: I'm in the process of 
10 filing several back year's worth of taxes. 
11 THE COURT: When is the last time 
12 you filed a tax return? 
13 MR. EDWARDS: It's been several 
14 years. 
15 THE COURT: When was the last time? 
15 MR. EDWARDS: I don't recall. 
17 THE COURT: Is this what you taught 
18 your son, also, I assume? 
19 MR. EDWARDS: What? 
20 THE COURT: To handle his affairs in 
21 this manner? 
22 MR. EDWARDS: No, sir. 
2 3 THE COURT: How much income did you 
24 have last year? 
25 MR. EDWARDS: Approximately a little 
Laurie Shingle, R.P.R, 
(801) 399-8510 
45 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
over 20,000. 
THE COURT: Well, if you made 2,000 
a month up through November of 1995, that's what, 
20,000, 22,000? 
MR. EDWARDS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you're telling me 
you collected what, 2,000 in the last eight months? 
a house? 
parents. 
been in your 
my name? 
name alone? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
name? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
EDWARDS: Yes, sir. 
COURT: Where do you reside? 
EDWARDS: 4695 Birch Creek. 
COURT: Is that an apartment or 
EDWARDS: It's a house. 
COURT: Whose name is it in? 
EDWARDS: I rent from my 
COURT: Has that name (sic) ever 
EDWARDS: The house ever been in 
COURT: Yes. 
EDWARDS: No, Your Honor. 
COURT: Has it been in their 
EDWARDS: Yes. 
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MR. 
have not. 
THE 
loans from them? 
MR. 
THE 
EDWARDS: No inheritance. No, 
COURT: Have you received any 
EDWARDS: Yes, I have. 
COURT: How much and when? 
I 
MR. EDWARDS: Over the last — well, 
let's see. In February I borrowed $10,000 from them; 
March --
THE COURT: So you had plenty of 
money to pay support 
MR. 
down.) 
THE 
MR. 
"> 
EDWARDS: (Nods head up and 
COURT: What else? 
EDWARDS: I have borrowed 
approximately $200,000 over a period of eight to 
years from them. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
besides yourself? 
MR. 
THE 
similar sums? 
MR. 
COURT: Basically supported 
EDWARD: To a large extent, 
COURT: Have other siblings 
EDWARDS: Yes, I do. 
COURT: Have they received 
EDWARDS: No, they naven't. 
10 
you? 
yes. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Anything 
2 further, Mr. Florence? 
3 MR. FLORENCE: No, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: The record should note 
5 that I have again met with Wesley in chambers and 
6 talked about the visitation situation and his 
7 relationship with his father. I think it's fair to 
8 say that that relationship is not the best it's ever 
9 been. 
10 But I still sense, Mr. Edwards, in spite of 
11 the rocky situation that you've been going through, 
12 that he has a desire to be part of your life. 
13 I'm concerned a little bit about the 
14 statements that you made and your methods of 
15 disciplining. I'm not without some experience as a 
16 father, and having sat here for a number of years and 
17 observed what goes on in families. And I'll have to 
18 admit, I'm somewhat appalled at your parenting 
19 techniques. I think you could well be served with a 
20 parenting class in your own right. Somehow you've 
21 missed the concept that 90 percent of the things that 
22 we teach our children are what they see us do, and 
23 that's a pretty bad example, if I were to consider 
24 that's the only thing that you've taught your son. 
25 You make big statements about integrity and 
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those kinds of things and yet here's a man who has 
filed no income tax for over six years, essentially 
has lived off his parents for that period of time, 
none of which would rate very high on my scale when 
it comes to integrity. 
You're a man of abilities. You're a man of 
education. You're a man of intelligence, yet you 
have sore records as far as using any of them. 
My major concern, as I've said many times, is 
Wesley. And I'm not naive enough to think that 
Wesley doesn't manipulate when and where he can. He 
is a child and children learn to do that early on. 
In particular, they learn to do that in divorce 
situations. And the parent who doesn't recognize 
that and allows himself to be drawn into that, does 
no service to their child. 
And I say this for your benefit, Mrs. Ross, 
because he uses you just as much as he uses his 
father. And he will continue to do that so long as 
you two allow it to occur. That doesn't mean you 
need to be cruel with him or mean with him. But it 
just means that you need to use some common sense as 
to what's going on. 
As to the question of support, Mr. Edwards, 
you know what your obligation is. I have tried to 
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1 the problem. She refuses — if you'll go back in the 
2 court file, you'll find that I made a motion pro se 
3 four years ago to have the Court appoint an -- some 
4 mediator, an arbitrator besides our son. 
5 And when my son sits there and beats me up 
6 I over child support that's been paid, so I -- I take 
7 my payments and I give them to my son so he doesn't 
8 bother — you know, so he doesn't antagonize me about 
9 that. 
10 The payments are timely relative to the month. 
11 I did miss one month. 
12 THE COURT: Well, sounds to me like 
13 you missed about two months in two successions. 
14 MR. EDWARDS: If there's — 
15 THE COURT: I think April and May 
16 was paid in June, was it not? 
17 MR. EDWARDS: Well, Feb — one month 
18 got missed and that was an error. I mean, I didn't 
19 know that it had not been paid. So when it was 
20 brought -- if my ex-wife would have communicated with 
21 me and said, you know, what about this month's 
22 payment or — I would have got it to her. 
2 3 THE COURT: All right. 
2 4 MR. EDWARDS: It was a month that it 
25 slipped my mind, but I have paid each and every 
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Clerk by the 10th of each month, a bench warrant will 
issue. 
Mr. Edwards, you understand what that is? 
MR. EDWARDS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Court finds that you're 
in Contempt of Court for failure to pay child support 
on time and for failure to pay each month as 
previously ordered by the Court. The Court will 
sentence you to 30 days in the Davis County Jail. I 
will stay the imposition of that sentence, contingent 
upon your payment of the support as previously 
ordered. Every month you fail to make the payment on 
time will be a separate contempt. 
So you have one 30 day commitment right now. 
If there are any future, any of those contempts will 
be added onto that 30 day period. 
The Court will find that you were in arrears 
when 
requi 
order 
benef 
prior 
month 
along 
this < affid 
red to pay 
that 
it of 
The 
you 
her 
[avit was filed and you 
' a reasonable att 
pay $250 to your 
attorney. 
Court will order that 
judgment and that you be o 
towards that judgment, and 
with your attorney's fees 
orneyj 
should 
rs fee. 
be 
I'll 
ex-wife for the 
that be adde 
rdered to pay 
that' 
-- or 
s to be 
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$50 per 
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ADDENDUM I I 
DAVID J. KNOWLTON UBN 1850 
Attorney for Defendant 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621 4852 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANA D. EDWARDS (ROSS), 
Plaintiff. 
Vs. 
BRUCE C. EDWARDS, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
Bruce C. Edwards, first being duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. That affiant is the defendant in the above entitled divorce matter. 
2. That the parties received a decree of divorce in the above matter on or about 
the 4th of November, 1995. Under the terms and conditions of the decree of divorce, 
the plaintiff was awarded the custody of the minor child of the parties, Wesley Kenneth 
Edwards, now 14 years of age. The decree granted to the defendant reasonable rights of 
visitation with the minor child. 
3. That despite extraordinary efforts by the defendant to enforce and exercise 
his visitation rights as granted under the decree of divorce, there has not been one year 
in the last 10 years when the defendant was allowed to fully exercise all rights of 
visitation as granted by the court. The plaintiff as custodial parent, over the years, 
has blocked and frustrated defendant's visitation in all ways imaginable. As a result, 
the parties have appeared back before the court again and again since the entry of the 
divorce over 10 years ago. 
4. That in November of 1994, after years of litigation between the parties, 
defendant filed and served a petition for the modification of the divorce decree 
seeking to change the custody of the minor child to the defendant. This action was 
AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION 
Civil No. 840735759 
Hon. Rodney S. Page 
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taken owing to the fact that the minor child, then 12 years of age, had indicated to 
the defendant his dissatisfaction with living with the plaintiff, his mother, and her 
new husband and complained about the treatment that he had received from them. This 
petition for the change of custody later came on for hearing before Commissioner Allphin 
and the commissioner was requested by the defendant to speak to the minor child. After 
this discussion, the commissioner indicated that the child was satisfied with the living 
and custody arrangement with his mother, and thereupon recommended that the defendant 
not be granted custody. The commissioner allowed, however, that a home study could be 
conducted, but that the defendant would be required to pay the cost of such a study. 
5. That the defendant was willing to drop the request for a change of custody 
following the hearing with Commissioner Allphin, however, after the hearing the child 
indicated to the affiant that when he met in private with the commissioner that the 
court never asked him to state a preference as to custody and that he was never allowed 
to give any opinion as to which parent should have his custody. The child further 
stated to the affiant that he continued in his preference and desire to live and 
reside with the defendant. At this time, it became clear to the defendant that the 
minor child could be telling the defendant one thing and the court another. In order to 
give the child the benefit of the doubt, the defendant had a home study performed by 
Joseph E. Prantil. During the home study, it became evident that the child was 
reasonably pleased to remain in the custody of the plaintiff and was mostly satisfied 
with that arrangement. Mr. Prantil thereupon recommended that the minor child remain 
in the custody of the plaintiff. More importantly, the home study pointed up to the 
defendant the real liklihood that what the child had been telling him was not his real 
preference and desire, but simply what he, the child, believed the defendant wanted to 
hear. Upon receipt of the home study and in reviewing the same with his counsel, it 
was apparent that given the real desire of the child to remain with his mother, that 
defendant had little possibility to prevail in an attempt at the change of custody. 
Had he not been misled by the child, he would not have pursued his petition for 
modification, notwithstanding defendant's love for his child and defendant's long time 
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desire to have the custody of his child. 
6. Thereupon, affiant instructed his counsel to communicate with plaintiff's 
counsel, Mr. Florence, that defendant would not thereafter pursue the change of 
custody. Defendant's counsel, Mr. Knowlton then telephoned the office of Mr. Florence 
and advised his secretary that defendant would not move forward his custody trial in 
the District Court. 
7. That in spite of plaintiff's knowledge that defendant would not be pursuing 
his request for a change of custody, Mr. Florence still wished further hearing in the 
District Court on such issues of back support, contempt, and attorney fees. Hearing 
was then scheduled with Judge Rodney S. Page for the 6th of November, 1995. 
8. That the parties and their counsel appeared before Judge Page on November 6, 
1995, whereupon Mr. Florence requested contempt sanctions be imposed upon the affiant 
for failure to pay some five months of child support and also for the defendant's 
failure to pay certain marital debts as set forth in the parties' decree and subsequent 
orders in the approximate sum of $1,000.00. 
9. That at the time of the hearing, it appeared that the defendant had paid all 
back child support in full prior to the hearing. However, Mr. Florence sought contempt 
for failure to have paid some $1,000.00 of marital debts. Defendant, through his counsel, 
sought to argue that the obligation to pay marital debts was part of the property 
division of the parties and not an obligation of child support or alimony. Not being 
an order to pay support, plaintiff's remedy would be for a judgment against the 
defendant, rather than a citation of contempt. Before defendant's position on the 
matter could be advanced to the court, Judge Page took the unusual step of ordering 
defendant's counsel not to make such an argument, stating in effect "Mr. Knowlton, 
I 
you are not going to make that argument." During this time, it became obvious to the 
defendant that the court had determined to punish the defendant notwithstanding the 
legal merits of the defendant's position. Accordingly, after defendant's counsel was 
ordered not to argue the merits of defendant's position, Judge Page ruled that the 
defendant was in contempt of court for his failure to have paid the marital debts 
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and ordered the defendant incarcerated forthwith for 3 days in the Davis County Jail. 
Further, the court ordered that the defendant pay the $1,000.00 of marital debts 
within 10 days or face further sanctions. This order was entered without even an 
inquiry of defendant's financial ability to make such a payment. Indeed, defendant 
did not have the ability to make this payment .within the time alloted by the court, 
but on advise of his counsel, borrowed this sum from his parents and paid it to Mr. 
Florence. 
10. That owing to the nature of affiant's business and this instant litigation, 
affiant has been in court hearings on many many occasions. In every such instance, 
it has been the experience of the affiant that both parties, individually or through 
their counsel, are given the opportunity to assert and argue their legal positions to 
the court before a decision is made by the court. Never before has the affiant 
observed the court specifically order an attorney not to advance a client's cause 
prior to the court's decision. When affiant's counsel was so ordered not to argue 
defendant's position (that failure to pay marital debts was not punishable by contempt) 
it became apparent to the defendant that the court determined to incarcerate him 
notwithstanding the facts of the case or the requirements of the law. Defendant then 
served three days in the Davis County Jail. 
11. That a further hearing was held before Judge Page on the 24th of January, 
1996. Defendant does not recall being served with any order to show cause or affidavit 
seeking relief or claiming any default by the defendant. This hearing was scheduled 
at the request of Mr. Florence apparently by conference call to Judge Page while 
defendant's counsel was in the office of Mr. Florence. At the time of the hearing 
Mr. Florence requested that the defendant again be punished by contempt. It was 
claimed that the defendant had violated an oral order of the court by requiring the 
minor child to perform certain household work to work off the cost of the home study. 
Also, as before, Mr. Florence requested attorney fees. At this hearing the court 
meet privately with the parties' child* Following this interview, the court spent 
some 20 to 30 minutes lecturing the defendant on how to raise a child. While not 
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finding the defendant in contempt, the court was severely critical of the defendant's 
parenting techniques. Specifically, defendant explained to the court that he thought 
it was important to teach the child principles of honesty and was concerned that the 
child had not been honest and forthright with defendant in the custody proceeding. 
12. That at the hearing of January 24, L996, plaintiff counsel requested 
attorney fees as before. Presumably, Mr. Florence sought attorney fees not only on 
the issue of the defendant's contempt, as granted earlier by the court, but also for 
time and effort on the custody issue. However, at the hearing of January 24, 1996, 
Mr. Florence never claimed that he had not received notice of the defendant's decision 
to withdraw the custody request. Indeed, Mr. Florence and his client did not appear 
at the January 24 hearing prepared to or intending to litigate the custody issue, but 
rather to seek further contempt. The very hearing was scheduled by conference call with 
the court from Mr. Florence's office at a time when Mr. Knowlton was in attendance. 
Mr. Florence had repeatedly been told that the custody would not be pursued. Similarly, 
at the hearing, Mr. Florence never claimed that he had no knowlege of defendant's 
withdrawal of the custody request. Defendant's counsel repeatedly explained to the 
court that he told Mr. Florence and his office of the withdrawal of the custody issue, 
and this was not controverted by Mr. Florence. Despite the stipulation of both counsel 
on the 22nd of February, 1996, the court in its Ruling of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Attorney's Fees stated: 
The Court hereby concludes that the primary purpose of the hearing on 
January 24, 1996, was in fact the custody issue; however, the parties 
stipulated early on to the custody matter, and the majority of the hearing 
concerned the question of payment of support and contempt. It did appear 
to the Court, however, that Defendant had.filed to notify Plaintiff that 
the issue was conceded even though that issue had been agreed between Defendant 
and his attorney several weeks before. 
From the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to the award 
of reasonable attorney's fees applicable to Defendant's Petition to Modify 
Custody which the Commissioner had recommended previously was without foundation. 
As can been seen, the court specifically found that defendant's counsel failed 
to notify plaintiff's counsel of defendant's withdrawal of the custody claim even 
where both counsel stipulated to this fact in open court. 
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13. That affiant finds it very strange and unusual that the court could 
have found facts disputed by the stipulation of both parties (that plaintiff knew 
of defendant's withdrawal of the custody claim) and proceed to award attorney fees 
on the'basis of such facts. 
14. That apparently at the hearing of January 24th, while meeting privately 
with the minor child, Judge Page told the parties1 child that he could call the judge 
directly if further difficulties occurred between him and the defendant. Defendant 
and his counsel were never informed of this fact or at least do not recall it being 
made a part of the record. It would, of course, be most unusual in affiant's 
experience for a court to invite ex parte communications of a future nature from a 
witness or a child the subject of litigation. 
15. That on or about the 3rd of June, 1996, the parties' child delivered a 
letter to Judge Page and may have met personally with the court. Neither defendant 
or his counsel were aware in advance of this meeting or communication until contacted 
by the court on a conference call with counsel on the 3rd of June, 1996. During this 
conference, the court indicated that he had a letter from Wesley and wished to 
schedule a hearing with the parties and their counsel. This hearing was set for the 
3rd of July, 1996. Prior to this conference call, defendant and his counsel had not 
seen any letter, had not been aware of any meeting between the court and the child, 
and had not been served with any motions, affidavits, or other pleadings. To the 
knowledge of defendant and his counsel, nothing was pending before the court. However, 
plaintiff and her counsel must have been aware of this cantact with the court as 
Mr. Florence indicated that he had an order to show cause pending and was still 
awaiting service on the defendant. In the opinion of defendant and from the 
experience of defendant, it would be most unusual for any court to in essence 
interview a witness, much less a minor child, in advance of a matter yet to be 
scheduled and heard by the court. Notwithstanding, the court indicated that he 
wanted the matter scheduled directly with him and that the Domestic Relations 
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Commissioner would be bypassed, contrary to the customary and usual proceedures of 
the judicial system in these matters. 
16. That during the telephone conversation of June 3, affiant's counsel 
requested of Mr. Florence copies of the pleadings that he was attempting to serve 
on the defendant. These were thereupon mailed to defendant and his counsel and 
delivered to both at his counsel's office June 7th. The documents, a Request for 
Order to Show Cause in re Contempt and Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce 
were signed by plaintiff's counsel May 20, 1996, well in advance of the child's 
letter and/or visitation to the court. Affiant must therefore conclude that the 
plaintiff and/or her counsel knew of and may have participated in the child's 
communication to the court, all in advance of defendant being served and without 
the knowledge of the defendant. 
17. That in the pleadings now filed with the court, plaintiff seeks to terminate 
the defendant's child visitation. This is essentially what the minor child has 
requested in his letter to the court. In addition, plaintiff again seeks to punish 
the defendant for contempt for failure to pay two months of child support. As with the 
November 1995 hearing, plaintiff again seeks to punish by contempt defendant's failure 
to pay the attorney fees ordered by the court. As in November, with the marital debts 
issue, it is the judgment and position of the defendant that an award of attorney fees 
is not a support order for child support or alimony the failure of which may be 
punished by contempt. However, as with the November hearing, the defendant is fearful 
that this court will not allow the defendant to be heard in opposition to plaintiff's 
position and that he and his counsel will be silenced and that defendant will again 
be jailed for failure and inability to pay a civil judgment not amounting to child 
support or alimony. 
18. That on the basis of the foregoing facts and circumstances; that the court 
has ordered defendant's counsel not to argue his legal position with the court; that 
the court has previously jailed the defendant; that the court has critically 
Affidavit of Disqualification Page 8 
found fault in the parenting style and ability of the defendant; that the court has 
invited future ex parte communications from the defendant's child; that the court has 
bypassed the customary and usual proceedures of this court; and that the court has made 
findings of fact in opposition of the stipulated facts of the parties in order to 
penalize the defendant, it is the judgment of the defendant that the Honorable Rodney 
S. Page has a bias or prejudice either against the defendant or in favor of the opposite 
party, and by virtue of the same should proceed no further in this matter, except tp^call 
in another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Dated this \Q* day of June, 1996. ^^<<^ri ^ SS'—" 7*f // 
BRUCE C. EDWARDS^' 
Defendant -^ 
Sworn and subscribed to before me this /CJ day of June, 1996. 
/ £ £ % , JOAN M. PATTERSON 
# ^ S § § $ \ HOTARYPUBUC'STATEcfUTAH 
B* ffiSinSl 427-27th STREET 
\& W ? # OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
'
<Q£5> / COMM. EXP. 6-30-99 
TARY PUBLIC, 
siding at Weber County*^.UT 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL OF RECORD 
The undersigned counsel of record for the defendant in the above matter hereby 
certifies, that in his opinion, the foregoing Affidavit of Disqualification is brought 
in good faith by the defendant. 
Dated this \Q> day of June, 1996. 
Attorney^ for Defendant 
JT CERTIFICATE OF MAILID 
Certify mailing a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Brian R. Florence, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 818 26th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, this V ^ L day of June, 1996, 
postage prepaid. 
ADDENDUM III 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANA D. EDWARDS (ROSS), 
Plaintiff, RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
v. 
BRUCE C. EDWARDS, 
Defendant. Case No. 840735759 
This Court has reviewed defendant's affidavit of disqualification to remove Judge Page 
on the basis of bias and prejudice. The Court has also reviewed plaintiff's response to 
defendant's affidavit. In addition, the Court has reviewed the various pleadings and rulings 
in the file. 
Pursuant to Rule 63(b) URCP, this Court is to pass on the legal sufficiency of the 
defendant's affidavit to determine if the motion should be granted or denied. Defendant, has 
in his affidavit, discussed several areas in his motion to disqualify. The Court will review 
each paragraph and issues raised. 
In reviewing the record, the Court has reviewed previous cases interpreting Rule 63(b) 
and believes the standard set forth in Christensen vs. Christensen. 18 Ut 2d 315 (1967) is still 
applicable today. It states: 
"Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias 
or prejudice exists. This, we take it. means reasonable reasons. (Emphasis added) 18 Utah 
2d at 318. 
The Court has applied this standard in this review in determining whether there is a 
1 
reasonable basis for bias ami prejudice raised in defendant's affidavit for disqualification. 
The Court finds the following as to defendant's allegations: 
1. Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are merely defendant's version of the history 
of the case preceding Judge Page's rulings. As indicated in plaintiffs response, they 
vigorously dispute many of the factual allegations as stated by the defendant in paragraphs 3, 
4, 5 and 6. e vie wing the f leadings and findings in Court finds that many of 
the statements set forth in paragraphs 1 through 6 are self-serving interpretations of the facts 
arid1 iIn i mot rcpiescm Ilk' actual facts upon which rulings were made in this case. 
2. As to paragraph 7, the Court finds that the purpose of the hearing was not to 
address the issue of custody, but rather was scheduled by plaintiff's counsel to address 
defendant's failure to pay child support and to pay as ordw.1 <»n (he judgment entered 
January 1994. 
3. As to paragraphs 8, 9 and ID, llic Court has reviewed the minute entry in the 
file in addition to the findings of fact and order signed by Judge Page concerning the 
November o, 1995 hearing. The Court finds that the minute entry specifically addressed 
defendant's failure to pay the $100 per month for the judgment. Ihe Court finds this failure 
to pay $100 as ordered was a proper basis for entering contempt against the defendant and 
does not represent bias and prejudice. 
4. As to paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, allegations that Judge Page did not allow Mr. 
Knowlton to ^ legal argument, the record is not clear. Plaintiffs counsel 
has indicated that Judge Page allowed Mr. Knowlton to argue his theory, but following the 
argument informed Mr. Knowlton that the argument was without merit. The burden is on the 
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defendant in his affidavit to show specific instances of bias and prejudice. If, in fact, Judge 
Page has inappropriately not allowed Mr. Knowlton to proceed with appropriate argument, 
the defendant could have easily provided a transcript of the hearing as evidence. He has 
failed to do so and mere accusations in the defendant's affidavit are not sufficient evidence in 
which to establish grounds for bias and prejudice particularly where plaintiff's counsel 
< i iiilf. in litis (lie ullegatmns in pILiinliff s affidavit. Therefore, the Court finds on the evidence 
presented there was no bias or prejudice in Judge Page's conduct in relating to Mr. Knowlton 
presenting legal arguments in the November hearing. 
5. As to paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, the Court has reviewed the record and finds 
that notice of the hearing of January 24, 1996 was sent out on January 12, 1996 by Mr. 
Brian Florence. That in reviewing Judge Page's ruling on plaintiff's motion for attorney fees 
found that Judge Page ruled as follows: 
"The Court hereby concludes that the primary purpose of the hearing on January 24, 
1996, was in fact the custody issue; however, the parties stipulated early on to the custody 
matter, and the majority of the hearing concerned the question of payment of support and 
contempt. It did appear to the Court, however, that defendant had failed to notify plaintiff 
that the custody issue was conceded even though that issue had been agreed between 
defendant and his attorney several weeks before." 
This Court reviewed the minute entry and findings of fact and conclusions of law and order 
signed I , Jml^ i1 Pap1 February 15 I *>% and approved as to form by defendant's attorney 
David J. Knowlton. In that order Judge Page, the Court found that the defendant had failed 
to pay the $1 n _ that he was ordered to pay within ten days of the hearing held 
November 6, 1995. With the assistance of his parents, it was paid to the plaintiff a few days 
prior to this trial. Accordingly, the Court will not find the defendant in contempt. Further 
Judge Page visited with the minor child to determine his concerns about his father's reaction 
3 
to the negative » 11st'nth rvaluation Specific findings approved by Mr. Knowlton indicated 
that Judge Page did not find the defendant in contempt of court for these actions, but 
recommended that he be more understanding and prudent in his dealings with the minor child 
on these issues. Judge Page would further consider the request of plaintiff for additional 
attorney fees for having to defend the Petition for Modification brought by the defendant. As 
indicated previously, this or iei was approved as to form b) defendant's attorney David J. 
Knowlton and it appears that the defendant is raising issues in these paragraphs that have 
been pi eviously order eel and agreed upon by his own legal counsel. It appears that the 
defendant is dissatisfied with an order approved by his own counsel. If defendant or his 
counsel felt the order was improper or in error their remedy was to challenge the order 
through a proper motion rather than attack the ordei collateral!) through this affidavit. Mr. 
Knowlton approved the order; for purposes of this review the Court assumes he did approve 
t] refore, the Court finds no bias and prejudice in 
Judge Page's actions listed in these paragraphs. 
6. As to paragraphs 14 and 15, the Court has reviewed the order by Judge Page 
that the minor child contact him if there are additional difficulties between him and the 
defendant. The Court has reviewed the letter sent by the minor child and the conduct by 
Judge Page in setting further hearings. The Court finds that Judge Page h ling 
responsibility to see that the welfare and best interests of the minor child were being taken 
care oil This is partu nlarly so in this case based on the prior inappropriate conduct of the 
defendant in relation to his son because of the custody evaluation. The Court finds based on 
the record that the conduct of Judge Page was appropriate in protecting the child and would 
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not con stitiite any inappropriate exparte communications. The Court doesn't find any bias and 
prejudice by Judge Page against the defendant. 
7. As to paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 , the Court has reviewed defendant's 
allegations and finds that they represent suppositions about what the Court may or may not do 
in regards to future hearings. There is no basis in fact for these allegations. The Court does 
not find (lin viwsv siillicinil l.irlual basis Mial Jiid^c Page has bias and prejudice against the 
defendant. 
CONCI USION: 
Based upon these findings the Court finds the affidavit of the defendant dated IO, 
1996 is legally insufficient and denies the defendant's motion to disqualify Judge Page 
pursuant to 63(b) on the basis of bias and prejudice In reviewing the totality of defendant's 
affidavit, it appears to this Court that the defendant appears dissatisfied with the prior rulings 
of Judge Page a using this motion to disqualify him from the case because of his 
dissatisfaction with prior rulings rather than on the basis of bias and prejudice. The Court 
remands this case back to Judge Page for further disposition and hearing in this matter. 
Dated June 18, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on the /77V 7 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Brian R. Florence 
818 - 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
David J. Knowlton 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Deputy Clerk 
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ADDENDUM! 1  
BRUCE EDWARDS 
ProSe 
P.O.Box 1886 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
(801)479-0666 
I N THE DISTRICT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANA D. EDWARDS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRUCE C. EDWARDS 
Defendant, 
ORDER GRANTING VISITATION 
Civil No. 35759 
Based on the motion of the defendant as supported by the affidavit of defendant, 
and the court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore, 
now, 
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the defendant 
shall be and is hereby granted visitation with the minor child of the parties to commence 
forthwith and to continue to and through the 14 day of June, 1996, as per the amended 
stipulated order of the parties, with the defendant to return the minor child to plaintiff on 
the 15th day of June, 1996. Further, defendant shall be entitled to forthwith have the 
minor child Wesley Edwards delivered to him for the purpose of carrying out the 
visitation. 
DATED this (e_ day of June, 1996 
BYTpOTTTIv 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
